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The ExtraterritorialReach of Sovereign Debt
Enforcement

Karen Halverson Cross

A significant barrierto enforcing sovereign debt obligations in U.S. court
has been finding and attaching non-immune assets of the foreign sovereign
debtor. In June 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued decisions in litigation
between Argentina and hedge fund NML Capital that will significantly benefit
creditors in the enforcement process. In one decision, the Court affirmed an
order to compel banks to provide information as to how Argentina moves its
monetary assets around the world, finding that the U.S. Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) does not limit a court's power to order post-judgment
discovery. In the other decision, the Court denied certiorari to review an
injunction prohibiting Argentina from making payments to holders of its
restructureddebt unless and until itpays NML Capital, and threatening to hold
liable third parties that aid and abet Argentina in processing such payments.
The NML
decisions follow protracted,previously unsuccessful efforts by
hedge funds holding defaulted Argentine debt to enforce New York judgments
againstArgentina.
This article argues that the discovery and injunction orders at issue in
NML contravene the FSIA due to their extraterritorialreach. The FSIA should
be read to prohibit these ordersfor several reasons. The Court has interpreted
the FSIA to be the exclusive basisfor jurisdiction againsta foreign state in U.S.
court. Additionally, the historical context in which the statute was adopted
supports a narrow reading of exceptions to execution immunity under the FSIA.
Finally, the presumption against extraterritoriality calls for a restrained
interpretive approach. The Supreme Court's interpretationof the FSIA in NML
Capital adopts an acontextual reading of the FSIA's language to reach an
unreasonableresult.
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INTRODUCTION

The Financial Times refers to the litigation between the hedge fund NML
Capital, Ltd. ("NML") and Argentina as the sovereign debt restructuring "trial
of the century." 1 In 2001, at the height of a severe financial crisis, Argentina
defaulted on over $80 billion of its external debt. It succeeded in restructuring
over 90 percent of the debt by entering into two bond exchanges - one in 2005
and another in 2010 - in which Argentina' s creditors agreed to accept new debt
instruments worth about one third of the debt's original face value.2 NML is
among the holdout creditors who refused to participate in these restructurings.
Instead, it brought suit in New York federal district court and obtained judgments for the full outstanding amount of the defaulted debt. But Argentina has
refused to pay, and NML generally has been unable to find non-immune
property against which to execute the judgments.
Two recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court significantly improved
NML's enforcement prospects. First, in Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital,
Ltd.,3 the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act4
does not limit a court's discretion to order extraterritorial, post-judgment discovery. NML Capital affirmed the Second Circuit's affirmance of an order
compelling international banks5 to provide information as to how Argentina
moves its monetary assets around the world (the "Discovery Order"). 6 Second,
the Supreme Court denied two petitions 7 for certiorari to review the Second
Circuit's affirmance of orders enjoining Argentina from making payments to
holders of its restructured debt unless and until it pays the plaintiffs, 8 and

1. See, e.g., Joseph Cotterill, Look Ma, No Uniquely RecalcitrantSovereign, FTALPHAvILLE (Nov.
1, 2013, 5:38 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/11/01/1677502/look-ma-no-uniquely-recalcitrantsovereign/.
2. See Karen Halverson Cross, Sovereign Arbitration in SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT paras.
12.18-12.19 (Rosa M. Lastra & Lee Buchheit eds., 2014). Detailed information regarding the NML litigation,
including
relevant
briefs
and
other
documents,
is
available
online
at
http:/ /www.shearman.com/en/services/practices/argentine- sovereign-debt.
3. 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014) [hereinafter "NT\L Capital"].
4. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1620 (2012) [hereinafter "FSIA"].
5. Bank of America and Banco de la Naci6n Argentina.
6. NMvfL Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg, No. 03 Civ. 8845 (TPG), (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011). The
Second Circuit decision affirming the order is EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg, 695 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2012).
The plaintiffs in the discovery proceeding comprise NNvIL and another hedge fund, EM Ltd. For simplicity, both plaintiffs are referred to in this article as "NML."
7. In February 2014, Argentina and a group of the creditors that participated in the 2005 and 2010
bond exchanges (the "Exchange Bondholders") each submitted a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, requesting review of the Second Circuit decision. The Supreme Court orders denying both
petitions are Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (June 16, 2014) (No. 13-990),
and Exch. Bondholder Grp. v. NTVIL Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (June 16, 2014) (No. 13-991).
8. The plaintiffs in the injunction proceeding comprise a group of holdout creditors, a handful of individual investors plus several hedge funds. The lead plaintiff, NML, is a Cayman Islands-based subsid-
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threatening to sanction any U.S. or foreign participant in the international financial system who processes payments made by Argentina in defiance of the
orders (the "Injunction Order"). 9 These decisions followed protracted, previously unsuccessful efforts by NML to enforce the New York judgments
against Argentina. 0
The NML litigation is already the subject of extensive commentary. 1 This
article does not address the merits of the Second Circuit's interpretation of the
pari passu covenant in the debt contract, a topic that has already been extensively addressed. 12 It does not focus on the appropriateness of injunctive relief
per se, 13 nor address in any detail the implications of the NML decisions for the
sovereign debt markets. Instead, this article supports an argument that the U.S.
government repeatedly asserted in the NML litigation: both the Discovery
Order and the Injunction Order are inconsistent with the structure and purpose
of the FSIA. The FSIA should be read to prohibit these orders for several reasons. The Supreme Court has interpreted the FSIA to be the exclusive basis for

iary of the hedge fund Elliott Associates. NML is a distressed debt, or "vulture," fund, a term used to
describe a hedge fund that purchases heavily discounted debt in the expectation of profiting by enforcing
the debt at its full face value. Again, for simplicity, the plaintiffs are referred to in this article collectively as "NML."
9. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012),
aff'd, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013). These orders amended and clarified previous injunctions dated February 2012 (referred to collectively and as amended as the "Injunction Order"). The Second Circuit decision affirming the amended orders is NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) [hereinafter "NML II"].
10. NML went so far as to sue the Bank of International Settlements in Switzerland, alleging that it
improperly allowed Argentina's central bank to maintain up to 90 percent of its foreign reserves on deposit. Argentina's debt default: Gauchos and gadflies, ECONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2011), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21533453. NML also persuaded a Ghanaian court to attach the ARA
Libertad, an Argentine naval vessel, until an international tribunal ordered Ghana to release the vessel.
"ARA Libertad" (Argentina v. Ghana), ITLOS Case No. 20, Order of Dec. 15, 2012, available at
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case no.20/C20 Order 15.12.2012.corr.pdf.
See
also EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 818 (2007)
(affirming order vacating attachment sought by EM Ltd. and NML of Argentine Central Bank reserves
earmarked to repay Argentina's debt to the International Monetary Fund).
11. See, e.g., W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt after NML v. Argentina, 8 CAPITAL
MARKETS L.J. 123 (2013); Tim R. Samples, Rogue Trends in Sovereign Debt: Argentina, Vulture
Funds, and Pari Passu under New York Law, 35 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 49 (2014), available at
www.ssrn.com; W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 31
YALE J. ON REG. 189 (2014); Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Damage Control, PETERSON INST. INT'L ECON.
POLICY BRIEF (May 2013), availableat www.iie.com.
12. See, e.g., Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mini Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts, and the
Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 72 (2013); MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE
THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 109-

38 (2013); William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign's Rational Choices, 53 EMORY
2004
L.J. 823 (
); Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Huntfor PariPassu, 23 INT'L FIN. L. REV.
20, 20 (2004); Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Huntfor PariPassu (Part11), 23 INT'L FIN. L.
REv. 47,47 (2004).
13. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the use of injunctive relief in sovereign debt litigation, including NML, see Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 11.
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jurisdiction against a foreign state in U.S. court. 14 Additionally, the historical
context in which the statute was adopted supports a narrow reading of exceptions to the execution immunity provided under the FSIA. 15 Finally, the presumption against extraterritoriality calls for a restrained interpretive approach.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the FSIA in NML Capital adopts an
acontextual reading of the FSIA's language to reach an unreasonable result.
Part II provides background to foreign sovereign immunity and to the presumption against extraterritoriality. Part III discusses the NML litigation, and argues
that the gap in the FSIA relating to extraterritorial scope of the discovery and
injunction orders at issue in NML should have been construed against enforcement. Part IV concludes.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
The Permanent Court of International Justice,16 foreign courts, and the
Restatement (Third) of ForeignRelations Law of the United States18 have taken
the position that foreign sovereign immunity is a principle of customary international law.1 9 However, the U.S. Supreme Court consistently has held that
foreign sovereign immunity is not a legal right but rather a matter of comity
between sovereigns. 20 In Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 21 a case about whether
the FSIA applied retroactively, the Court concluded that the FSIA does not
affect substantive rights (and therefore the presumption against retroactive
application did not apply to the FSIA). The Court acknowledged that the FSIA,
a statute that codifies the standards governing immunity, is more than merely a

14. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428, 434-35 (1989).
15. See infra Part II(C).
16. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), available at
http:/ /www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07 lotus.htm.
17. See HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY at 18--19 (2d ed. 2008) (citing decisions from
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom).
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. IV,

ch.5, subch. A, intro note (1987) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)] (describing foreign sovereign immunity as "an undisputed principle of customary international law").
19. See also Preamble to The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/English_3-13.pdf [hereinafter Jurisdictional Immunities Convention], which states that "the jurisdictional immunities of foreign
states and their property are generally accepted as a principle of customary international law." The Jurisdictional Immunities Convention was concluded in 2004 but is not yet in effect, although it already
has been signed by 28 countries (not including the U.S.) and ratified by 16. Status Tracker, UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg no=III13&chapter=3&lang=en (last updated Feb. 3, 2015 07:02 PM EDT).
20. Fox, supra note 17, at 13-15.

21. 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
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jurisdictional statute.22 However, it found that foreign sovereign immunity does
not promise future immunity but "reflects current political realities and relationships, and aims to give foreign states . . . 'protection from the inconvenience of suit as a gesture of comity.' 23
Until relatively recently, after states adopted the restrictive approach to
immunity, foreign sovereigns generally were absolutely immune from suit. In
practice, this meant that there was little recourse for creditors against a foreign
sovereign debtor, other than denying the sovereign access to future credit, or
relying on diplomatic or military intervention by the creditor's home state.24 In
addition to codifying the restrictive approach, a principal purpose of the FSIA
was to establish consistent guidelines for determining foreign sovereign
immunity, which previously had been determined by the State Department on
an ad hoc basis.25 The statute sets forth a rule of absolute immunity for foreign
states from suit in U.S. court,26 and then lists enumerated exceptions to the
rule. Similar to its approach to immunity from suit, the FSIA establishes a
rule of absolute immunity of foreign sovereign property from attachment,
arrest, and execution, subject to enumerated exceptions, as discussed in Part
II(C) below. In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess,28 the Supreme Court held
that Congress intended the FSIA to be the "sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction
over a foreign state" in U.S. court.29
In Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran,30 a case arising under the FSIA's
terrorism exception, the Ninth Circuit held that sovereign immunity is more
than just a defense to liability on the merits; by enacting the FSIA, Congress
also intended to protect foreign states from other burdens associated with litigation. The court found this to be particularly true in the context of immunity
from execution, because of the controversy historically associated with attach-

22. Id. at 695.
23. Id. at 696 (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003)).
24. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 68
(2014).
25. See Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a "Person"? Does it Matter?: PersonalJurisdiction,
Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 115, 119 (2001)
(citing FLOWERS, JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES, H.R.
No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976)).
26. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012).
27. The principal exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity that are relevant to sovereign debt litigation are waiver, commercial activity, and actions to enforce arbitral agreements or confirm arbitral
awards. Id. at §§ 1605(a)(1), (2), (6). FSIA Section 1605A provides an exception to immunity for certain
claims against a foreign state for terrorist acts or providing material support for terrorist acts.
28. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
29. Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
30. 627 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2010).
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ing foreign sovereign property. 31 The plaintiffs in Peterson sought to order Iran
to assign them rights to tariff revenue that French shipping companies owed to
Iran's port authority. The court rejected the plaintiffs' motion, finding that the
intangible property, deemed to be located in France, was not eligible for
assignment under the FSIA,32 and that the sovereign immunity defense could be
raised sua sponte, even though Iran failed to appear. Peterson, therefore,
stood for several propositions, which the NML Capital decision calls into question: first, that the FSIA was intended not only to provide foreign sovereigns
with a defense to liability but also to shield them from the cost and inconvenience of litigation more generally; second, that the exceptions to immunity from
execution under the FSIA are more narrowly defined than the exceptions to
immunity from suit; and third, foreign sovereign property located outside of
U.S. territory cannot be targeted for purposes of enforcement.
In spite of the FSIA, creditors have had little difficulty establishing jurisdiction over foreign sovereign debtors in U.S. courts. This is true in part because,
ever since Congress enacted the FSIA, parties to sovereign debt contracts
governed by New York law almost invariably have included in their loan
documentation waivers of sovereign immunity from suit. 34 Additionally, in
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,35 the Supreme Court established that a
foreign sovereign's default on a U.S. dollar-denominated debt obligation that
was payable in New York fell within the FSIA's commercial activity exception.
Similarly, the Second Circuit held in Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago36 that an action to enforce a foreign sovereign's default on
such a debt obligation was not barred by the act of state doctrine. In other

31. Id. at 1127-28 (citing Foremost-McKesson Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 443
(D.C. Cir. 1990)). The political sensitivity surrounding the issue of immunity from execution is addressed at infra Part II(C).
32. The court found that the FSIA only "abrogates the immunity of all Iranian commercial property
in the United States." Id. at 1131. Since the debtor was a French company, the debt was found to be located in France and therefore immune from assignment. Id. at 1132. The Supreme Court's NML Capital
decision calls into question the continued validity of this finding, however. See infra notes 125-26 and
accompanying text.
33. Id. at 1128-29.
34. See Weidemaier, supra note 24, at 86. Examining a dataset of over 1800 sovereign bond contracts issued between 1823 and 2011, Weidemaier found a pronounced shift in the use of foreign sovereign immunity waivers after the enactment of the FSIA. Although such waivers were relatively uncommon before the enactment of the FSIA, after 1977, "virtually all" new bond issuances included a waiver
of foreign sovereign immunity from suit. Id. at 86. Waivers of immunity from execution, on the other
hand, were not frequently utilized until the 1990s. Id. at 87.
35. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
36. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
37. Act of state doctrine is a principle adopted by U.S. courts that "the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." Lee C.
Buchheit, Act of State and Comity:
Recent Developments, in JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL DEBT OBLIGATIONS 95, 96 (D. Sassoon and D. Bradlow, eds., 1987) (quoting Underhill
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words, the real barrier to enforcing foreign sovereign debt obligations in U.S.
court has not been obtaining a judgment against the sovereign debtor; rather, it
has been finding assets against which to execute the judgment. The current
sovereign debt litigation environment has been aptly characterized as a "hunt
for assets." 38
In a recent paper,39 Schumacher, Trebesch and Enderlein document a recent
and dramatic increase in creditor litigation against defaulting sovereign debtors.
They compiled a list of sovereign debt restructurings between 1970 and 2010,
and searched for cases filed in foreign courts by commercial creditors in
connection with these debt crisis events. 40 The paper identifies 108 instances of
litigation by commercial creditors against 25 different foreign sovereign
debtors. Of these, 54 - half of the instances - were filed since 2000,41 and 90
percent of the cases filed after 2000 were initiated by distressed debt funds.42
The authors attribute the increase in litigation in part to judicial decisions, such
as Weltover, that limit the defenses a foreign sovereign debtor can raise in U.S.
court. 43 Other causal factors include the trade-openness of sovereign debtors
and an increase over time both in the amount of debt restructured and in "haircut size," or the amount of debt reduction creditors agree to in the restructurings.44 The authors attribute an increase in attachment attempts in recent sover45
eign debt litigation to the prevalence of distressed debt funds as claimants.
To summarize, a principal limitation on enforcement of foreign sovereign
debt is the immunity accorded to the property of the sovereign debtor. Litigation to enforce sovereign debt, particularly litigation involving attachment
attempts against foreign sovereign property, has significantly increased over the
past decade. For these reasons, the NML litigation, particularly its impact on the
scope of immunity of foreign sovereign property against execution, is quite

v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
38. Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch & Henrick Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in Court: The
Rise
of
Creditor
Litigation
1976-2010
7
(2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2189997.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 8. The database excludes litigation filed in the debtor's domestic courts, as well as suits
filed by retail investors, and counts multiple suits filed by the same creditor (such as NML) as a single
instance of litigation. Id. at 8-9.
41. Id. at 38, Table 1. Of the 120 instances of litigation, 102 of these were filed in New York federal district court, 15 in English court, and 3 in arbitration. The paper's focus on debt issued under New
York and English law is explained as being due to the dominance of New York and English lawgoverned bonds in sovereign debt markets. Id. at 1, n.3.
42. Id. at 2. For an explanation of distressed debt, sometimes known as "vulture," funds, see supra
note 8.
43. Schumacher, Trebesch & Enderlein, supranote 38, at 6.
44. Id. at 6-7.
45. Id. at 8.
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significant.
B. Extraterritorialityand the FSIA
The presumption against extraterritoriality is an interpretive principle of
U.S. law to the effect that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
46
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction" of the U.S.
The stated purpose behind the presumption is to "protect against unintended
clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord." 47 As Justice Holmes observed in American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 48 holding a party liable according to laws other than those of
the country where the conduct took place not only would be unjust, but also
"would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to
the comity of nations ....
Although the presumption against extraterritoriality has existed for about
two centuries,5 0 its influence declined during the mid-1900s, until the Supreme
Court revived the presumption in 1991 with its adoption of the Aramco decision. Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has applied the presumption to
limit the extraterritorial scope of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement
Act, 2 the Patent Act, 3 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, s4 and the Alien
Tort Statute. 5
According to Supreme Court decisions on extraterritoriality, the rationale
behind the presumption is based on considerations of international law, international comity and separation of powers, among other considerations.5 6 First,
customary international law sets limits on a state's authority to apply its law to

46. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281,285 (1949)).
47. Id.
48. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
49. Id. at 356.
50. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,16 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 85, 85 (1998) (stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality has been around "nearly as
long as there have been federal statutes"). Cases invoking the presumption date back to the early 1800s.
Id. at 85 n.2 (citing The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 610, 630-32 (1818)).
51. Id. at 85-86.
52. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
53. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007).
54. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
2 0 13
55. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664-69 (
).
56. Curtis A. Bradley, TerritorialIntellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 505, 513-16 (1997). Additional considerations behind the presumption include consistency
with conflicts of laws principles and the notion that Congress is presumed to legislate with domestic
interests in mind. Id.
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activity occurring outside its borders. According to the well-known Charming
Betsy 5 7 canon of statutory interpretation, an act of Congress should be interpreted wherever possible in a manner that is consistent with international law. 58
Second, the Supreme Court's statement in Aramco about preventing clashes
between U.S. and foreign law 59 suggests that the presumption is also grounded
in considerations of international comity. 60 Third, Aramco, Kiobel,61 and other
Supreme Court decisions applying the presumption have done so out of separation of powers concerns - specifically, concerns that the determination of
whether and how to apply U.S. legislation to conduct abroad raises difficult and
sensitive policy considerations falling "outside both the institutional competence and constitutional prerogatives of the judiciary. ''62 Related to considera
tions of comity is the notion that the presumption protects U.S. interests. A
territorial approach to statutory interpretation serves U.S. interests over the long
term because it discourages other countries from imposing their laws extraterritorially on U.S. persons.63
As stated, the presumption against extraterritoriality is grounded in concerns about the potential for federal statutes to regulate matters under the authority of another state. A question to think about is whether the presumption
should apply to the FSIA, a statute whose function is to open U.S. courts to
"plaintiffs with pre-existing claims against foreign states. 64 The Supreme
Court has answered this question in the affirmative. It has held that the FSIA
deals not only with federal court jurisdiction over suits against foreign states
but also with the scope of foreign sovereign immunity, a matter of substantive

57. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
58. Bradley, supra note 56, at 514-15. Some academics have argued that the presumption against
extraterritoriality would be more consistent and coherent if applied in conjunction with international law
considerations. See Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality,97 VA. L. REV.
1019, 1030-33 (2011) (arguing that the Charming Betsy canon, but not the presumption, should apply
when Congress implements international law under multilateral sources of legislative authority); John H.
Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality,104 AM. J. INT'L L. 351, 396 (2010) (arguing that
the presumption should apply strictly, loosely, or not at all, depending on whether the U.S. has sole or
primary jurisdiction to legislate under customary international law).
59. See supra text accompanying note 47. The Supreme Court quoted this same language from Aramco in its recent Kiobel decision. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
60. Bradley, supra note 56, at 515.
61. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
62. Bradley, supra note 56, at 516.
63. Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality'sFifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455,
1494, 1497 (2008). The U.S. government invoked a similar idea in its oral argument before the Supreme
Court in NAIL Capital. See Transcript of Oral Argument of Edwin S. Kneedler on behalf of the United
States at 19, NAL Capital, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842) [hereinafter "U.S. Oral Argument"] (stating
that the U.S. would be "gravely concerned" if a foreign court issued an order comparable to the Discovery Order that was targeted at U.S. government assets).
64. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 695 (2004).
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federal law.65 The Supreme Court applied the extraterritoriality presumption to
the FSIA in Amerada Hess, a decision that predates Aramco. The issue in
Amerada Hess was whether the tort exception to the FSIA 66 applies where the
tort at issue occurred on the high seas. Although the plaintiff argued that the
high seas were within the admiralty jurisdiction of the U.S., the Court applied
the presumption against extraterritoriality and concluded that the tort exception
should only apply to torts occurring within U.S. territorial waters.67
The Supreme Court has even applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute, 68 a statute the Court found to be "strictly jurisdictional. 69 In Kiobel, the Court held that plaintiffs' allegations against a
Nigerian, a U.K., and a Dutch oil company relating to defendants' conduct in
Nigeria, did not "touch and concern" the U.S. with sufficient force to displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS .7 0 The Court
found the principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality to
apply to jurisdictional as well as regulatory statutes, observing that, if anything,
the "danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified" in the context of the ATS, since it (like the FSIA) is concerned
not with "what Congress has done but instead what courts may do., 71 The
Court cited its previous decision in Sosa for the idea that the potential foreign
policy implications of recognizing causes of action under the ATS should make
courts "particularly wary" of interfering with the political branches' discretion
in managing foreign affairs.72
Construing gaps in the FSIA in light of the presumption is particularly
appropriate because, in contrast to the situation in Kiobel and other cases
involving private defendants, cases arising under the FSIA typically involve
foreign sovereign defendants.73 When litigation is brought against a foreign

65. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1983) (holding that the
FSIA does not merely concern access to the federal courts, but also codifies the standards governing
foreign sovereign immunity "as an aspect of substantive federal law"); see also Altmann, 541 U.S. at
695.
66. FSIA Section 1605(a)(5) provides an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for certain noncommercial torts "occurring in the United States." FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2012). "United States"
is defined to include "all territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States." FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (2012).
67. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428, 440-41 (1989).
68. The Alien Tort Statute confers on federal courts "jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (2012).
69. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)).
70. Id. at 1669.
71. Id at 1664.
72. Id. (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727).
73. The FSIA, however, also confers diversity jurisdiction on federal courts to hear claims against
U.S. citizens brought by foreign states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (2012).
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state, the concerns behind the extraterritoriality presumption - comity concerns
of interfering with the authority of a foreign state, and separation of powers
concerns relating to the courts interfering in delicate matters of foreign policy are particularly pronounced. Although (at least as a matter of U.S. law) the
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity is grounded in comity and reciprocity
whereas the presumption against extraterritoriality is based on comity as well
other considerations discussed above, both doctrines relate to a state's respect
for the sovereignty of other states.
In Daimler AG v. Bauman, a recent decision addressing Constitutional
limits on general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, the Supreme Court
emphasized how an overly expansive view to personal jurisdiction can raise international comity concerns.7 Although the U.S. courts who have addressed the
issue generally agree that a foreign state is not a "person" for purposes of the
Due Process Clause and "minimum contacts, 7 6 as a matter of international law
it is generally accepted that a state does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a
dispute involving a foreign sovereign defendant unless there is a jurisdictional
link to the forum state. 77 Similarly, a forum state's jurisdiction over the proper
ty of a foreign sovereign is strictly territorial; any action to enforce a judgment
against foreign sovereign property must be brought in the jurisdiction where
that property is located.
Even if a statute already makes clear that it applies extraterritorially (e.g.,
the FSIA's commercial activity exception, which encompasses actions based on
acts outside of U.S. territory causing a "direct effect" within the U.S.), the presumption is still applicable to determine the extent of a statute's extraterritorial
scope. 79 Analogous to these decisions is Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in
Hartford Fire Ins. v. Cal.,80 where he argued that even if a statute (such as the
Sherman Act) applies extraterritorially, the extent of the statute's application is
limited by the requirements of international law and principles of prescriptive

74. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
75. Id.at 763.
76. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic, 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009);
see also Halverson, supra note 25, at 135-41 (discussing the rationale behind this line of case law).
77. Fox, supranote 17, at 78-84; James Crawford, Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign
Immunity, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 820, 857 (1981); see also Halverson, supra note 25, at 148-51 (discussing international law limits onjurisdiction to adjudicate).
78. Crawford, supra note 77, at 852. As the Supreme Court stated in NAL Capital,U.S. courts generally do not have the power to execute against property (whether sovereign- or privately-owned) located in other countries. Republic of Argentina v.NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S.Ct. 2250, 2257 (2014).
79. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. 550 U.S. 437, 455-56 (2007) (stating that, even when
Congress has enacted a statute with extraterritorial application, the presumption "remains instructive in
determining the extent of the statutory exception") (emphasis in original).
80. 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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comity, as reflected in the reasonableness limitation of Restatement (Third)
Section 403.81
To summarize, the Supreme Court has embraced the presumption against
extraterritoriality, and has invoked related comity concerns, in numerous recent
decisions involving corporate defendants. Decisions such as Kiobel and
Daimler stand in contrast with NML Capital, where the Court interpreted the
FSIA as according no protection whatsoever to a foreign state's extraterritorial
property.
C. FSIA Provisions on Immunity From Attachment, Arrest, and Execution
As a matter of international practice, the immunity of a foreign state's
property from execution is significantly more restricted than immunity from
suit. As Fox explains,
[e]nforcement against State property constitutes a greater interference with a State's
freedom to manage its own affairs and pursue its public purposes than does the pronouncement of a judgment or order by a national court of another State. States increasingly maintain some of their national wealth in foreign reserves, and discretion
82
as to their disposal is seen as an element in the exercise of sovereign authority.

Therefore, the issue of execution on foreign state property has long been a
particularly sensitive one. 3 Sovereigns tend to resist efforts to execute judg
ments against their property, viewing such exercises of jurisdiction by the
forum state as an interference with sovereign interests, even when the property
is located within the territory of the forum state.8 4 Indeed, the issue of execution
against foreign state property was one of the most challenging and contentious
issues addressed during the negotiation of the Jurisdictional Immunities
5
Convention.
Even after the U.S. adopted the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity, it adhered to an approach of absolute immunity of foreign state
property from execution until passage of the FSIA in 1976. Before the FSIA's
passage, plaintiffs bringing an action against a foreign state in U.S. court had
no means of executing against the defendant's property. 6 The ICSID
Convention successfully circumvents foreign sovereign immunity by providing

81. Id. at 814-19.
82. Fox, supra note 17, at 601.
83. Crawford, supra note 77, at 852.
84. David P. Stewart, The UN Convention on JurisdictionalImmunities of States and Their Property, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 194, 206 (2005).
85. Id.
86. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976); Crawford, supranote 77, at 852.
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for the enforceability of an ICSID award as if it were a final judgment in any
Contracting State. 7 However, even the ICSID Convention does not derogate
from the immunity of a foreign state's property from execution under applicable domestic law. 8
For these reasons, the immunity accorded a foreign state's property under
the FSIA was intended to be broader than immunity from suit. Recognizing that
the existing rule in the U.S. was that a foreign state's property was absolutely
immune from execution, the drafters of the FSIA sought to lower existing
barriers, but only "in part."8 9 In De Letelier v. Republic of Chile,90 the Second
Circuit acknowledged that Congress deliberately set different standards for
immunity from suit and immunity from execution, even though, as was the case
in De Letelier, a plaintiff sometimes ended up having a "right without a remedy." 91 The De Letelier court observed that the FSIA was enacted at the same
time as comparable European legislation, which did not provide any mechanism for enforcement of judgments, instead requiring claimants to satisfy
judgments against foreign sovereigns through executive or administrative
channels.92
Consequently, even though the FSIA provides that a foreign sovereign
defendant is liable in the same manner as a private defendant would be once an
exception to immunity from suit is found to apply, 9 enforcement against that
sovereign defendant's property is subject to a more restrictive set of rules.
FSIA Section 1609 provides that "the property in the United States of a foreign
state shall be immune from attachment, arrest and execution," except as provided in Section 1610. In turn, each of the exceptions enumerated in Section
1610, including the waiver exception, is qualified by the requirement that
foreign state assets must be "used for a commercial activity in the U.S." In
other words, Section 1610 establishes a threshold requirement: in order for
foreign state property to be attachable, there must be a connection between that
property and a U.S.-based commercial activity.94

87. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, art. 54(l), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1291, T.I.A.S. No. 6090.
88. Id. at art. 55.
89. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976).
90. 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984).
91. Id. at 798.
92. Id.
93. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2012).
94. George K. Foster, Collecting from Sovereigns: The Current Legal Frameworkfor Enforcing
Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments Against States and Their Instrumentalities and Some Proposals
for its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 665, 672 (2008).
Additionally, in enforcing ajudgment against a foreign state, U.S. courts will not attach the assets of
an agency or instrumentality of that state, such as a state-owned enterprise, except in circumstances
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Except for brief mention in the legislative history that injunctive relief may
be available against a foreign state where circumstances are "clearly appropriate, 95 the text and legislative history of the FSIA are otherwise silent on the
extent of availability of injunctive relief under the statute. Except for a provision allowing the Attorney General to stay discovery against the U.S. in the
context of the terrorism exception, the FSIA is similarly silent as to the degree
to which discovery can be ordered, whether to establish an exception to
immunity or with respect to foreign state property.96 As with injunctive relief,
the legislative history only briefly refers to the right to discovery, noting that
the FSIA bill does not attempt to address issues of discovery because existing
law is "adequate.",97 Thus the interpretive question affecting both the injunction
order and the discovery order at issue in NML is one on which the statute is silent - whether FSIA limits injunctive relief or a discovery order, particularly
when that injunction or discovery order targets a foreign state's extraterritorial
property.
As for injunctions, the Second Circuit has held that a court cannot grant
through an injunction relief that the FSIA prohibits it from providing by
attachment. In S&S Mach. Co. v. Masinexportimport,98 a Romanian stateowned company agreed to sell machine parts to a New York buyer in exchange
for payment through irrevocable letters of credit. When the buyer was dissatisfied with the quality of the goods delivered, it obtained a pre-judgment attachment of the seller's New-York based assets and an injunction preventing the
seller from negotiating the letters of credit. The district court subsequently vacated the injunction and attachment orders on the basis of FSIA Section
1610(d), which prohibits pre-judgment attachment unless the foreign sovereign
has explicitly waived such immunity. The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that
the seller had not explicitly waived its immunity. It also found that the district
court was correct to dissolve the injunction:
The FSIA would become meaningless if courts could eviscerate its protections
merely by denominating their restraints as injunctions against the negotiation or use
of property rather than as attachments of that property ....
courts in this context

comparable to corporate veil-piercing. First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983); Foster, supranote 94, at 682-84.
95. S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 22 (1976). The report goes on to indicate that the existence of a court's
power to order an injunction does not determine its power to enforce such an order. Id. For example, a
court's imposition of a fine for violating an injunction may be unenforceable under FSIA Section 1609.

Id.
96. Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 795 (2d Cir. 2012).
97. S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 22 (1976).
98. 706 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter S&S Machinery].
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may not grant, by injunction, relief which they may not provide by attachment.

99

S&S Machinery is still followed; it was recently invoked in a decision that
invalidated on FSIA grounds a post-judgment order to compel third parties to
turn over funds owed to a foreign sovereign. 1°°
In Autotech Techs. LP v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp.,1 °1 the Seventh
Circuit invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality to limit the scope of
the FSIA' s execution provisions. The court upheld a district court's authority to
issue contempt sanctions against a Belarusian state-owned semiconductor company for violating a settlement agreement. 10 2 However, the court vacated the
writ of execution because it failed to identify specific properties in the U.S.
against which to enforce the judgment. 10 3 It found that the FSIA does not authorize execution of a foreign state's assets regardless of their location, stating
that the court "would need some hint from Congress before [it] felt justified in
adopting such a breathtaking assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 104
III. THE NML

LITIGATION

A. Background
The debt instruments that NML is seeking to enforce were issued pursuant
to an agreement concluded between Argentina and its fiscal agent in 1994.105
Under the agreement, Argentina agreed to waive its immunity from suit in state
or federal New York court, 10 6 and also to waive its immunity from execution of
a judgment "to the fullest extent permitted" by law.1 0 7 The agreement contained
a covenant that the bonds would "rank pari passu and without any preference
among themselves," and that Argentina's payment obligations under the bonds
would "rank at least equally" with its other unsecured and unsubordinated

99. Id. at 418; see also Stephens v. National Distillers & Chem.Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1230 (2d Cir.
1995) (stafing that the principle behind S&S Machinery'sprohibition "should apply broadly").
100. Thai Lao-Lignite v. Gov't of the Lao Peoples' Democratic Republic, No. 10 Civ. 5256, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56815, at *10-13. (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
101. 499 F.3d 737, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2007).
102. Id. at 744-45.
103. Id. at 750.
104. Id.
105. Fiscal Agency Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and Bankers Trust Company,
Fiscal
Agent,
dated
as
of
October
19,
1994,
available
at
http:/ /www.shearman.com/-/media/Files/Services/Argentine-SovereignDebt/2013/FiscalAgencyAgreementOct 191994.pdf [hereinafter FAA].
106. Id. at § 22.
107. Id. atA-18.
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debt.10 8 NML did not participate in either the 2005 or 2010 debt exchange, but
instead sought to enforce the debt, as already discussed.
1. Discovery Order
As noted,10 9 NML experienced significant difficulty finding assets against
which to enforce the judgments it obtained in 2003. In 2010, it served document subpoenas on Bank of America and Banco de la Naci6n Argentina, seeking to "locate Argentina's assets and accounts" and "learn how Argentina
moves its assets through New York and around the world."11 Both subpoenas
sought detailed information regarding the accounts Argentina111 maintained
anywhere in the world, including opening and closing dates, current balances,
and documents relating to transfers into or out of these accounts. 112 Argentina
moved to quash these subpoenas and NML moved to compel. At a hearing that
was later confirmed in the Discovery Order, Judge Griesa denied the motion to
quash and granted NML' s motion, stating that the court "intended to serve as113a
'clearinghouse for information'" to assist NML in its enforcement efforts.
Argentina appealed.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court' s order, rejecting Argentina' s
argument that the FSIA bars discovery of immune assets. While conceding that
a court sitting in New York would lack the power to attach Argentine property
located abroad, it found that the district court's power to order post-judgment
discovery is unaffected by the FSIA. 114 The Second Circuit drew a distinction
between jurisdictional discovery under the FSIA and post-judgment discovery.
It reasoned that foreign sovereign immunity concerns are not present once an
exception to immunity is established and the purpose of discovery is for enforcement purposes.1 15 Since Argentina expressly waived its immunity in the
debt instrument, the concerns expressed in precedents dealing with jurisdictional discovery under the FSIA were not relevant. 116 Finally, it found that since the
subpoenas were directed at commercial banks that lack sovereign immunity,
the banks' compliance with the discovery orders "will cause Argentina no bur-

108. Id. at § I(c) (the "paripassu"covenant).
109. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
110. EM Ltd. V. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 2012).
111. The subpoena broadly defined Argentina to include its agencies, instrumentalities, ministries,
political subdivisions, state-owned companies, or persons acting on behalf of these entities. Id. at 204.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 208-09.
115. Id. at 210.
116. Id. at 209-10.
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1
den and no expense.
After the Supreme Court granted Argentina's petition for certiorari, the
U.S. government filed an amicus brief,118 and the Deputy Solicitor General
appeared at oral argument, in support of Argentina's position. Argentina and
the U.S. Government argued that the Discovery Order was overly broad, in
contravention of the FSIA.11 9 Although Argentina had waived its immunity
from execution, the U.S. government argued that the FSIA's execution provisions still protected Argentina's extraterritorial property from the Discovery
120
Order regardless of any waiver.

Justice Scalia delivered the Supreme Court's decision affinning the Second
Circuit. In contrast with the Court's approach in Amerada Hess, which presumed a foreign state to be immune from suit unless a statutory exception could
be proven,121 NML Capital starts with the reverse presumption, finding that
"any immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in an American court must
stand on the [FSIA]'s text. 1 22 In other words, in NML Capital, the Court interpreted the FSIA's general silence with respect to discovery to mean that the
FSIA does not limit a court's discretion to order discovery of a foreign state's
assets,123 finding that any "gap" in the statute regarding discovery is for
Congress to resolve. 124 Observing that the FSIA's execution provisions only
apply to a foreign state's U.S.-based property, the opinion goes on to state that
the FSIA's text accords execution immunity only to a foreign state's property
that is located within the U.S. 12 5 In other words, NML Capital's reasoning
suggests that the FSIA's execution provisions simply do not apply to protect a
foreign state's extraterritorial property against expansive discovery orders of a
U.S. court. Although Justice Ginsburg dissented, she did not challenge the extraterritorial scope of the Discovery Order, only objecting to the order's application to Argentina's non-commercial property. 126

117. Id. at 210.
118. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Republic of Argentina v.
NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2256 (2014) (No. 12-842) [hereinafter U.S. NML CapitalAmicus
Brief].
119. Id. at 14-18.
120. U.S. Oral Argument, supra note 63, at 26.
121. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428,439-43 (1989).
122. NML Capital, 134 S. Ct.at 2256.
123. Id., at 2256-57.
124. Id. at 2258.
125. Id. at 2257.
126. NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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2. Injunction Order
The injunction order was issued in connection with a separate lawsuit.
NML anticipated that it would have difficulty enforcing its judgments, and so it
retained an additional amount of Argentine debt, bringing suit in New York
federal district court to demand specific performance of that debt, alleging
breach of the pari passu covenant in the debt agreement. 127 In February 2012,
Judge Griesa granted NML's request for an injunction, directing Argentina to
make a "ratable payment" to NML whenever it pays the Exchange Bondholders. 128 He interpreted the pari passu covenant to require Argentina to extend
equal treatment to NML when making payments to holders of the restructured
debt. 129
The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), joined by the Departments of
Treasury and State, submitted an amicus brief to the Second Circuit urging reversal. 130 In addition to contesting the district court's interpretation of the pari
passu covenant, 131 the DOJ argued that the injunction contravened the FSIA's
execution provisions because of its extraterritorial reach. 132 Since Argentina
makes payments on its restructured debt outside of U.S. territory, the DOJ
argued that the injunction prohibiting these payments violates the FSIA because
it targets Argentina's immune property. 133 Quoting Autotech, the amicus brief
characterized the Injunction Order as a "breathtaking assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction., 134 The brief also quoted S&S Machinery135 for the idea that a
court cannot circumvent the immunity of foreign state property under FSIA
136
through the use of an injunctive order.
The Second Circuit disregarded the DOJ's arguments. It affirmed the district court's interpretation of the pari passu covenant. It also found that the injunction did not attach, arrest, or execute upon any of Argentina's property, and
therefore it did not function as an attachment masquerading as an injunction
under the rationale of S&S Machinery.137 The court characterized the injunc-

127. See Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 11, at 3.
128. NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 254-55 (2d Cir. 2012) [hereinafter NML

I]129. Id. at 254.
130. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, NML 1, 699 F.3d 246
(No. 12-105-cv(L)) [hereinafter "U.S. NML I Amicus Brief"].
131. Id. at 5.
132. Id. at 23.
133. Id. at 24-25.
134. Id. at 22.
135. For a discussion of S&S Machinery, see supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
136. U.S. NML I Amicus Brief, supra note 130, at 25-26.
137. NML 1,699 F.3d at 261-63.

2015]

SOVEREIGN DEBTENFORCEMENT

tion, which prohibited Argentina from transferring payment to some bondholders but not others, as only affecting Argentina's property "incidentally. 1 38
While affirming the injunction, the Second Circuit remanded for the district
court to clarify its terms, in particular, the fonnula for payment and the effects
of the injunction on third parties, including participants in the international
139
payment system for the Exchange Bonds.
In November 2012, Judge Griesa issued his amended injunction order.
First, he clarified that "ratable payment" means 100 percent of what is due to
NML at the time of payment. 140 Additionally, he found that all "Participants" in
the payment process of the restructured debt 14 1 were prohibited under FRCP
65(d)(2) 142 from aiding and abetting Argentina in any violation of the order.143
"Participants" was defined to include (i) indenture trustees and/or registrars under the Exchange Bonds, in particular Bank of New York Mellon; (ii) registered owners of the Exchange Bonds and nominees of the depositories for the
Exchange Bonds; (iii) clearing corporations and systems and settlement agents
for the Exchange Bonds; and (iv) trustee paying agents and transfer agents for
the Exchange Bonds. The order specifically named both U.S. and foreign participants in the payment system, in particular, Depository Trust Company (New
York), Euroclear S.A./N.V. (Belgium), and Clearstream Banking S.A.
(Germany and Luxembourg), as falling within the definition of "Participants. "144
Argentina filed a petition before the Second Circuit for rehearing and for en
banc review of NML L. Although the DOJ submitted a brief in support of
Argentina's petition, 145 echoing the arguments made in its previous amicus
146
brief, both petitions were denied.
In August 2013, the Second Circuit affirmed the amended Injunction Order,
reaffirming its previous decision that the injunction does not violate the

138. Id. at 262-63.
139. Id. at 265.
140. Injunction Order, supranote 9, at paras. 2(b) - (c).
141. See id. at 1 (noting that the restructured debt is also referred to as the "Exchange Bonds," and
the holders of the debt as the "Exchange Bondholders").
142. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2) defines the scope of an injunction as binding not only the enjoined
party, but also any person who is "in active concert or participation" with that party, so long as the person receives notice of the order.
143. Injunction Order, supranote 9, at para. 2(e).
144. Id. at para. 2(f).
145. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of Argentina's Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, NML 1, 699 F.3d 246 (No. 12-105-cv(L)).
146. See Order, NML 1, 699 F.3d 246 (No. 12-105) (Feb. 28, 2013); Order, NML 1, 699 F.3d 246
(No. 12-105) (Mar. 26, 2013).
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FSIA,1 47 and finding that it need not decide whether it has personal jurisdiction
over certain participants in the international payment system for the Exchange
Bonds. 148 The court also rejected an argument raised by several amici - mainly,
that the injunction would negatively affect future sovereign debt restructurings.
The court characterized Argentina's behavior as extraordinary and found that
the facts of NML litigation were unlikely to be repeated in the future. 149 The
Second Circuit, however,
stayed the Injunction Order pending appeal to the
0
15

Supreme Court.

Argentina filed a petition for certiorarito review the Second Circuit decision in NML II. The Exchange Bondholders filed their own petition for certiorari, arguing that the Injunction Order uses the restructured debt obligations as
leverage to coerce Argentina into paying NML, increases the risk of
Argentina's default, and therefore constitutes a taking of the Exchange Bondholders' property.1 51 The Supreme Court denied both petitions in June 2014.152
Once the Supreme Court denied appeal, the stay on the Injunction Order was
lifted.
B. FSIA Analysis
As discussed, 5 3 in its amicus submissions and at oral argument in the NML
litigation, the U.S. government consistently argued that Judge Griesa's expansive discovery and injunction orders contravene the structure and the purpose
of the FSIA. These arguments were dismissed, first by the Second Circuit, and
then by the Supreme Court with respect to the Discovery Order. Additionally,
the Supreme Court's decision in NML Capitalinterpreted the FSIA' s execution
provisions as affording no protection to a foreign state's property located outside of the U.S. It is true that the FSIA' s execution provisions expressly refer to
a foreign state's U.S.-based property. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in

147. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
148. The court reasoned that the injunction merely "provide[s] notice to payment system participants that they could become liable through Rule 65 if they assist Argentina in violating" the injunction,
and that any jurisdictional issues can be raised if and when such a participant is adjudicated to be found
liable. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 243 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134

S.Ct. 2819 (2014)[NML If].
149. The court observed thatArgentina has been "an uniquely recalcitrant debtor," and that newer
sovereign debt contracts almost invariably contain collective action clauses, contract provisions that
permit a supermajority of creditors toimpose a debt restructuring on holdout creditors. Id.at247.
150. Id. at248.
151. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12-15, Exch. Bondholder Grp. v.NML Capital Ltd., 134 S.
Ct.2819 (June 16, 2014) (No. 13-991).
152. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (June 16, 2014) (No. 13990), and Exch. Bondholder Grp. v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (June 16, 2014) (No. 13-991).
153. See supra Part 111(A).
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NML Capital, a U.S. court would lack the power to execute upon any property
located outside of the U.S.15 4 It should not follow, however, that a foreign
sovereign is then vulnerable to discovery or injunction orders of a U.S. court
targeted at its property located abroad. Such a result defies the purpose of the
FSIA, ignores the context in which the statute was adopted, and contravenes the
spirit, if not the letter, of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
The policies that the Supreme Court has invoked in favor of the presumption against extraterritoriality - adherence to international law norms relating to
prescriptive jurisdiction, considerations of international comity, and separation
of powers concerns15 5 - also weigh in favor of interpreting gaps in the FSIA so
as to restrain a court's power to issue extraterritorial discovery and injunction
orders against a foreign sovereign defendant. Although the presumption against
extraterritoriality was invoked in Argentina's briefs filed with the Supreme
Court,1 5 6 it was not mentioned at oral argument before the Court in NML
Capital, nor in the NML Capital opinion or in NML I or I. The following sections first discuss the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the FSIA in its
decision upholding the Discovery Order, and then address the extraterritorial
reach of the Second Circuit' s decision upholding the Injunction Order.
1. Discovery Order
Judge Griesa granted NML's request for a worldwide discovery order regarding Argentina' s bank accounts in order to serve as a "clearinghouse for information" to support NML's efforts to find and attach Argentine assets. The
Second Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the FSIA does not
limit a court's ability to seek discovery regarding a foreign state's assets for
purposes of executing a judgment.1 5 7 Federal district courts have already followed the NML precedent by granting broadly-drafted discovery order requests
in connection with the enforcement of judgments against foreign sovereign de158
fendants.
By holding that the FSIA does not limit a court's discretion to order post-

154. NAIL Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2257.
155. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
156. Brief for Petitioner at 36-38, NAIL Capital, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842), (2014); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. 134 S. Ct. 2819 (June 16,
2014) (No. 13-990) (discussing extraterritoriality concerns and citing Kiobel).
157. See supra Part 111(A).
158. See Aurelius Capital Partners v. Republic of Argentina, No. 07-2715, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32459, at *24-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (granting a discovery order seeking information regarding any contract or financing arrangement Argentina or any branch of the Republic is entering into in the U.S.,
Germany, France, "or anywhere"); Thai Lao Lignite (Thail.) Co. v. Gov't of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, 924 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (rejecting, in reliance on NA4L, Laos' FSIA-based
objections to a broadly-drafted discovery order).
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judgment discovery, NML Capital changes the law in the Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits, where courts until recently interpreted the FSIA to require a
more restrained approach to post-judgment discovery. In a decision emphasizing the FSIA's limits on the immunity of foreign state assets from execution,
the Fifth Circuit stated that the court on remand should order discovery "circumspectly and only to verify allegations of specific facts crucial to the immunity determination." 159 The Ninth Circuit quoted this same language with
approval in a decision addressing discovery in connection with execution of a
judgment under the FSIA. 160 Most significantly, the Seventh Circuit held that
the FSIA requires that post-judgment discovery must be limited to the specific
property identified for attachment. 16 ' The Rubin court reversed a lower court
order seeking discovery of information regarding all Iranian-owned assets within the U.S., finding such an order to be incompatible with the FSIA's text,
structure, and history. 162 It found that the FSIA was intended to protect foreign
states from the "cost and aggravation of discovery, 163 and emphasized that the
FSIA's exceptions to attachment immunity are more narrowly drawn than its
exceptions to immunity from suit. 164 The Rubin court also relied on its previous
decision in Autotech, which applied the presumption against extraterritoriality
165
to limit the territorial scope of the FSIA's execution provisions.
As noted, the NML Capital decision begins with the proposition that there
is no protection to a foreign state unless the FSIA provides for it, concludes that
the FSIA's silence should be read to impose no limits on a U.S. court's power
to order discovery of a foreign state's property, and suggests that the FSIA does
not accord any protection whatsoever to a foreign state's extraterritorial property. This approach is inconsistent with the FSIA's basic structure, which begins
with the proposition of absolute immunity, subject only to enumerated exceptions. In its decision in Amerada Hess, the Court found that the FSIA is the
"sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state" in a U.S. court; in

159. Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 260 (5th Cir. 2002), as amended on denial of reh'g (Aug. 29, 2002) (quoting Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 534
(5th Cir. 1992)).
160. Af-Cap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007).
Although the D.C. Circuit affirmed contempt sanctions on a foreign sovereign for failure to comply
with an extraterritorial discovery order, it rejected arguments relating to the order's scope because the
argument was not presented in the proceedings below. F.G. Hemisphere Assocs. LLC v. Democratic
Republic of Congo, 637 F.3d 373,379 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
161. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 796-99 (7th Cir. 2011), as corrected (Apr. 1,
2011).
162. Id. at 785.
163. Id. at 795.
164. Id. at 795-96.
165. Autotech Technologies LP v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., F.3d 737, 750-51 (7th Cir.
2007).
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other words, the only way a plaintiff can get into U.S. court with a claim
against a foreign state is by finding that one of the FSIA's exceptions to
immunity applies. By interpreting the FSIA's silence against the foreign
sovereign, NML Capital's approach to execution immunity is in tension with
Amerada Hess's approach to immunity from suit. The Court's approach in
NML Capital also disregards the historical context in which the FSIA was
adopted. As observed in De Letelier and as reflected in the statute's legislative
history, the FSIA was enacted at a time when the property of a foreign state had
enjoyed absolute immunity from execution, both in the U.S. and around the
world. 166 Such a reading of the statute also subverts a broader purpose of the
FSIA, which is to shield foreign states generally from the inconveniences of
litigation in U.S. court, as recognized in numerous decisions,167 including those
168
of the Supreme Court.
Finally, the Court's interpretive approach turns the presumption against extraterritoriality on its head. NML Capital's reading of the FSIA leads to the absurd result that a foreign state's extraterritorialproperty, property that a U.S.
court admittedly lacks the power to attach, is accorded no protection from a
U.S. court's enforcement orders.
To summarize, the FSIA's silence regarding discovery should cut in the
opposite direction, against allowing discovery orders targeted at foreign state
property that is immune under the FSIA's execution provisions. Additionally,
the FSIA's execution provisions should be read to shield a foreign state's extraterritorial property from discovery orders that a U.S. court might otherwise
have the power to issue against a private defendant. This approach gives deference to the U.S. government's position in the NML litigation, and supports the
narrower reading of the FSIA adopted in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
A narrow reading of the fight to post-judgment discovery under the FSIA is
also justified on policy grounds. As the U.S. government observed at oral argument in NML Capital, even if the U.S. is unlikely to become a "rogue debt-

166. See supra Part II(C).
167. See, e.g., Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2010); Kelly
v. Syria Shell Petroleum Development B.V., 213 F.3d 841,849 (5th Cir. 2000) ("FSIA immunity is immunity not only from liability, but also from the costs, in time and expense, and other disruptions attendant to litigation."); United States v. Moats, 961 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[S]overeign immunity is an immunity from the burdens of becoming involved in any part of the litigation process ...
.");
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 1989)
("[S]overeign immunity is an immunity from trial and the attendant burdens of litigation, not just a defense to liability on the merits.").
168. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003) (quoting Verlinden B.V. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)) (foreign sovereign immunity is meant "to give foreign states and
their instrumentalities some protection from the inconvenience of suit").
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it still has an interest in ensuring that foreign courts refrain from someday issuing comparable orders seeking information on the location of U.S. reserves, so as to serve as a "clearinghouse for information" regarding U.S. government property around the world.1 7 0 The fact that the Discovery Order was
directed at third parties does not eliminate international comity concerns. As
the U.S. government has argued,1 71 Argentina has a substantial interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the information targeted for disclosure.
Similarly, upholding the broad extraterritorial scope of the Discovery Order
raises separation of powers concerns. The order at issue in NML Capital is
likely to be particularly offensive to the sensibilities of foreign states because it
involves international discovery. As the reporters to The Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law observed "no aspect of the extension of the American
legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the U.S. has given rise to so much
friction as the requests for documents in investigation and litigation in the
U.S. ' 172 As Justice Blackman once observed in a case involving a private
defendant, international discovery implicates foreign interests, the presence of
which "creates a tension between the broad discretion our courts normally exercise in managing . . . discovery and the discretion usually allotted to the
Executive in foreign matters. 17 3 In the context of enforcing claims against a
foreign sovereign defendant, such discovery requests are particularly sensitive.
In the context of the NML litigation, plaintiffs' interest in procuring an effective
remedy is outweighed by Argentina's interest in avoiding the burdens of litiga17 4
tion with respect to its extraterritorial property.
or,"169

2. Injunction Order
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the Injunction
Order, the rationale of the NML Capital decision, issued the very same day as
its orders denying certiorari, suggests that the Court may well have affirmed

169. As Justice Sotomayor remarked to the U.S. Deputy Solicitor General at oral argument in NAIL
Capital, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842) "How often do you think the U.S. is going to default on paying a
judgment and have people chase it all around the world?" U.S. Oral Argument, supra note 63, at 19.
170. Id.
171. U.S. NAIL CapitalAmicus Brief, supra note 118, at 32-33.
172. Restatement (Third), supra note 18, at § 442.
173. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522,
551-52 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. As commentators have argued in the context of jurisdictional discovery against a foreign state,
such discovery requests require a court to balance the plaintiff's interest in having its day in court
against the sovereign interest in avoiding the burdens of litigation. Steven R. Swanson, Jurisdictional
Discovery Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 445, 491 (1999); Joseph M. Terry, Comment, JurisdictionalDiscovery Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 66 U.
Cml. L. REv. 1029, 1037 (1999).
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the Second Circuit had it decided to review the decision. The Court's reasoning
in NML Capital flatly rejects an argument the U.S. government made repeatedly in the NML litigation: that the FSIA's execution provisions protect against
court orders directed at the extraterritorial property of a foreign state. 175 As
argued in the previous section, the FSIA should be read to protect a foreign
sovereign's extraterritorial property. For the reasons elaborated below, the injunctive order at issue in NML improperly targeted Argentina's extraterritorial
property.
Judge Griesa's injunction order, as implemented, will have extraterritorial
effect. This is so not only because of the order's extraterritorial reach as to third
parties, but also because the order's in terrorem effect on these parties is designed to coerce Argentina into using its financial reserves - immune property
that is not located within U.S. territory - to pay NML. As discussed, 176 the
Injunction Order applies to all Exchange Bondholders, whether U.S. or foreign,
to European clearinghouses, and to the agents of these parties. As Euroclear
S.A./N.V. argued in an amicus submission before the Supreme Court, the Injunction Order directly conflicts with Belgian legislation, which was enacted
specifically to protect Euroclear from an attachment order, or any other blocking order that would prevent the proper functioning of Euroclear as a settlement
177
system.
In addition to its impact on third parties, the Injunction Order targets
Argentina's overseas assets. The order allows Argentina no reasonable alternative but to default or use its immune assets to pay NML. It does so by threatening participants in the international payment system with contempt sanctions if
they process payments from Argentina that would defy the order. The likelihood is extremely low that participants in the international payment system,
especially those institutions operating in New York, would risk being held in
contempt of court. 178 In an affidavit submitted to the Second Circuit, Stephen
Choi observed that even if Argentina wanted to defy the injunction order,
Argentina has no means of paying the Exchange Bondholders outside of the existing payment system. The clearinghouses (Depository Trust Company,
Euroclear S.A./N.V., and Clearstream Banking S.A.) are enjoined from cooper-

175. U.S. NML I Amicus Brief, supra note 130, at 22-23; U.S. Oral Argument, supra note 63, at
18-19; U.S. NML CapitalAmicus Brief, supranote 118, at 10-12.
176. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
177. Brief of Amicus Curiae Euroclear Bank SA/NV in Support of Petitioner at 9-10, NML II petition for certiorari(No.13-990) (Mar. 24, 2014).
178. Supplemental Declaration of Stephen Choi in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 151, at Appendix C [hereinafter Supplemental
Choi Declaration]; see also Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 11, at 12; Euroclear amicus brief supra
note 177, at 5 (discussing "no reasonable person would risk contempt ...").
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ating with Argentina to alter the payment mechanism, and it would not be possible for Argentina to independently obtain infornation as to the identities and
holdings of the Exchange Bondholders. 179 The trustee under the indenture governing the Exchange Bonds, Bank of New York Mellon, is similarly enjoined
from assisting Argentina in defying the order and, in any event, is bound to protect the interests of the Exchange Bondholders, not Argentina.180
In other words, the Injunction Order leaves Argentina only two choices:
pay NML, or pay no one and default on the Exchange Bonds. Defaulting on the
restructured debt is not only a failure for Argentina but it also irrevocably
harms the Exchange Bondholders, and even the global economy in general.181
Since Argentina's supply of financial reserves is limited and mostly held outside of the U.S., in effect the injunction order compels Argentina to transfer its
immune assets from abroad in order to pay NML, thereby achieving a result
that the FSIA otherwise would prohibit if attempted through attachment. After
June 2014, when the Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the Injunction
Order, the Second Circuit's stay on its enforcement was lifted. Barred by the
Injunction Order from making its June 2014 payment on the Exchange Bonds,
Argentina defaulted on its restructured debt one month later. 18 2 As Joseph
Stiglitz characterized the situation, it was the first time in history that a country
was ready and willing to pay its creditors but was blocked by a judge from
13
doing so. 1
As discussed, 18 4 in NML I, the Second Circuit distinguished its previous
S&S Machinery decision, reasoning that the Injunction Order does not execute
on any of Argentina's property. This is a narrow and formalistic distinction.
S&S Machinery involved an injunction that ordered the foreign sovereign seller
not to collect payment under letters of credit, whereas NML involves an injunction that effectively compels Argentina to use its overseas assets to pay NML.

179. Supplemental Choi Declaration, supra note 178, at Appendix C, paras. 5, 9, 12. Choi further
observes that, even if the foreign clearinghouses cooperated with Argentina to pay only those bondholders located abroad, Argentina's failure to pay the U.S. cleared Exchange Bonds would still constitute a
default. Id. at para. 12.
180. Id. at paras. 6, 11.
181. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Declaration of Stephen Choi in the United States Court of
Appeals of the Second Circuit, supra note 151, at Appendix B, paras. 19-22. Among other things, default may trigger credit default swaps, $100 million of which NML's parent company, Elliot Associates,
acquired in expectation that Argentina would default on the Exchange Bonds. Id. at paras. 18, 20.
182. Argentina unsuccessfully petitioned Judge Griesa for a stay from the Injunction Order to make
a June 2014 payment on the restructured debt, subject to a thirty-day grace period that expired at the end
of July.
183. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Martin Guzman, Argentina default? Griesafault is much more accurate,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
7,
2014,
11:37
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/aug/07/argentina-default-griesafault-more-accurate.
184. See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
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In both cases, the injunction functions as an alternate means of obtaining prop18 5
erty that should otherwise be immune from attachment under the FSIA.
NML's expansive interpretation of the availability of injunctive relief against a
foreign state contravenes the FSIA's intent and implicates all of the policy concerns that the Supreme Court has invoked in support of the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
U.S. courts traditionally use care when issuing injunctions against foreign
sovereign defendants. Even in cases involving private defendants, U.S. courts
have invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality as a basis for limiting
injunctive relief. Vanity FairMills v. T. Eaton Co., 18 6 a decision involving the
extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act, expressed a note of caution regarding
the extraterritorial reach of an injunction:
We realize that a court of equity having personal jurisdiction over a party has power
to enjoin him from committing acts elsewhere. But this power should be exercised
with great reluctance when it will be difficult to secure compliance with any resulting decree or when the exercise of such power is fraught
18 7 with possibilities of discord and conflict with the authorities of another country.

Although courts have construed the FSIA as allowing a court to issue an injunction against a foreign state, even to issue contempt sanctions where the foreign sovereign has clearly violated an injunction,188 such action raises comity
concerns, especially when the injunction has extraterritorial reach.189 Sanctioning a foreign state contravenes the Jurisdictional Immunities Convention (not
yet in effect, but signed by 28 states), which prohibits a party from imposing
sanctions on a foreign state for violating an injunction. 190

185. See S&S Mach. Co. v. Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d at 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1983) (concluding
that once the district court found that the foreign sovereign defendants were immune from prejudgment
attachment, it "properly refused to sanction any other means to effect the same result").

186. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
187. Id. at 647.
188. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Fed'n, 915 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154-55

(D.D.C. 2013) (imposing contempt sanctions of $50,000 per day on Russian Federation until it complies
with the Court's injunction order); Autotech Technologies LP v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., F.3d
737, 744 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming a court's power to issue contempt sanctions against a foreign state
for failure to comply with an injunction order); FG Hemisphere Associates v. Democratic Republic of
Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 378-79 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (imposing contempt sanctions on the Democratic Republic of Congo for failure to comply with a discovery order).
189. For example, in Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65 (3d Cir.
1994), the Third Circuit vacated a district court order compelling the Philippine government to refrain
from harassing witnesses who had testified against it in a suit adjudicated in New Jersey. The court
found that the district court had unduly interfered with the foreign state's domestic law enforcement activities, in violation of principles of international comity. Id. at 77-79.
190. Article 24(1) of the Jurisdictional Immunities Convention provides that "no fine or penalty
shall be imposed on the State for failure or refusal" to comply with a court order.
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19 1
Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation
highlights the foreign relations complications that can arise from broad injunctive
relief issued against a foreign state. In the case, a federal district court enforced
an injunction against the Russian Federation and its Ministry of Culture to return rare religious papers and other artifacts that it had allegedly expropriated
from the plaintiffs, a religious organization. The court eventually imposed civil
contempt sanctions of $50,000 on the Russian defendants for each day they
continued to violate the court order. The U.S. appeared, arguing against the imposition of contempt sanctions, warning of the potential impact the sanctions
would have on ongoing cultural exchanges between the U.S. and Russia, and
urging that the dispute instead be resolved through diplomatic channels. The
court disagreed with the U.S. and issued the sanctions anyway. In the aftermath
of the Agudas Chasidei Chabad decision, Russia's Ministry of Culture filed a
retaliatory claim against the U.S. Library of Congress in Russian court, seeking
recovery of books on loan to the Library. 192 The unsuccessful outcome of
Agudas Chasidei Chabad illustrates why diplomatic channels may be preferable to broad injunctive orders in resolving sensitive claims against foreign sov193
ereigns.
In its amicus submissions before the Second Circuit in NML I and before
the Supreme Court in NML Capital, the U.S. similarly argued that upholding
the expansive discovery and injunction orders at issue in the NML litigation
would be harmful to U.S. relations with other foreign states. 194 Justice Scalia's
opinion in NML Capital dismissed such concerns, suggesting that "[t]hese
apprehensions are better directed to that branch of government with authority to
amend the [FSIA]. 1 95 NML Capital's dismissal of the U.S. government's international comity concerns can be contrasted with other recent Supreme Court
decisions involving private defendants, in which similar concerns were embraced by the Court in support of its decisions. In Kiobel and in Microsoft, the
Supreme Court invoked foreign relations implications and international comity
concerns as justifications for limiting the reach of the Alien Tort Statute and the
U.S. Patent Act, respectively. 196 Similarly, in Daimler, the Court invoked con-

191. 915 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D.D.C. 2013).
192. Irna Tarsis & Elizabeth Varner, Reviewing the Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Federation, et
al Dispute, ASIL INSIGHTS
(Mar.
9,
2014),
available
at
www.asil.org
/insights/volume/ 18/issue/ 8/reviewing-agudas- chasidei-chabad-v -russian-federation-et-al -dispute.
193. See id. (suggesting that "[p]erhaps it is time" to return to diplomatic channels or arbitration to
resolve the standstill in Agudas ChasideiChabad).
194. U.S. NML I Amicus Brief, supra note 130, at 28-29; U.S. NML CapitalAmicus Brief, supra
note 118, at 18-22.
195. Exch. Bondholder Grp. v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819, 2258 (June 16, 2014) (No. 13991).
196. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1664-65; for a quotation of the relevant text from Kiobel, see infra the
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siderations of international comity to restrict the power of U.S. courts to adju197
dicate a dispute against a foreign corporation.
Finally, although the Second Circuit characterized the NML litigation as extraordinary and unlikely to be repeated,1 98 the implications of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the FSIA in NML Capital are quite broad and potentially of concern to any foreign state facing the prospect of an enforcement order affecting its extraterritorial property. The Supreme Court interpreted the
FSIA as not according any protection to such property. This reading creates a
glaring hole in the statute which, until Congress amends the FSIA, leaves foreign sovereign property vulnerable to extraterritorial enforcement orders from
U.S. courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The NML litigation raises challenging interpretive issues that the text and
the legislative history of the FSIA do not clearly address. In NML Capital, the
Supreme Court held that the FSIA does not limit a court's power to order postjudgment, worldwide discovery. In NML I and NML II, decisions the Supreme
Court decided not to disturb, the Second Circuit found that the Injunction Order
did not contravene the FSIA's enforcement provisions because it did not operate as an attachment of Argentina's property. This article argues for a different
outcome in the NML litigation, due to the historical context in which the FSIA
was adopted and the policies behind the presumption against extraterritoriality.
The FSIA's silence as to its applicability to discovery and injunction orders
should be interpreted so as to impose territorial limits on the property that can
be subject to such orders. Exceptions to the immunity of a foreign state's
property against execution should be interpreted in a limited way, not an expansive one. Such an interpretive approach is necessary in order to carry out the
purpose of the FSIA: to protect foreign states from the burdens of litigation
and "to minimize irritations in foreign relations arising out of such litigation. "199
The stakes of the NML litigation were high. When the Injunction Order was
appealed for the second time to the Second Circuit, the courtroom was packed
at oral argument. 00 In addition to the U.S., about a dozen amici submitted

text accompanying note 217; Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007).
197. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763.
198. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
199. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 45 (1976).
200. According to a security guard at the federal courthouse, the only other case he had seen that
generated a similar level of interest was the Martha Stewart trial. See Shearman & Sterling LLP, Don't
Cry for Me Argentine Bondholders: Important Argument in the Second Circuit (Feb. 28, 2013), availa-
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briefs to the court - academics, bondholders, participants in the payment system, and a former deputy managing director of the International Monetary
Fund. 20 1 Similarly, about fifteen amiCi20 2 submitted briefs in support of
Argentina's second petition for certiorarito the Supreme Court with respect to
the Injunction Order.20 3
In previous cases involving sovereign debt enforcement, the Second Circuit
has been mindful of New York's status as a preeminent commercial and financial center. In Allied Bank,20 4 the Second Circuit reversed on rehearing its pre
vious decision to deny enforcement of a Costa Rican debt obligation on the
basis of international comity. 20 5 The court's previous decision had provoked an
immediate and negative reaction from New York's financial community; 20 6 the
United States submitted an amicus brief on rehearing that persuaded the court
that "its earlier interpretation of United States policy had been wrong. 20 7 Re
versing itself on the comity issue, the court also rejected Costa Rica's act of
state doctrine defense:
[t]he United States has an interest in maintaining New York's status as one of the
foremost commercial centers of the world .... In addition to other international activities, United States banks lend billions of dollars to foreign debtors each year.
The United States has an interest in ensuring that creditors entitled to payment in
the United States in United States dollars under contracts subject to the jurisdiction
of United States courts may assume that, except under the most extraordinary circumstances, their rights
will be determined in accordance with recognized princi2 8
ples of contract law. 0

ble at http://www.shearman.com/-/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2013/02/Dont-Cry-for-MeArgentine-Bondholders -Important- /Files/View -full-memo-Dont- Cry-for-Me-ArgentineBondhol /FileAttachment/DontCryforMeArgentineBondholderslmportantArgumen
.pdf.
201. For the text of these amicus curiae briefs, see Briefs and Other Related Documents, NML Capital v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012).
202. Some of the amici were the same parties who had filed amicus curiae briefs with the Second
Circuit. These were joined by the governments of France, Brazil and Mexico, a group of former federal
judges, and economist Joseph Stiglitz.
203. Argentina filed two petitions for certiorari of the Second Circuit's decisions affirming the injunction orders. The first petition requested review of the Second Circuit's decision affirming Judge
Griesa's December 2011 order (NML I). The Republic of France and several other amici submitted
briefs. The Supreme Court denied Argentina's petition in October 2013. Republic of Argentina. NML
Capital, Ltd., 134 S.Ct. 201 (2013). The Supreme Court denied Argentina's second certioraripetition,
along with the certioraripetition filed by the Exchange Bondholders, in June 2014. See supra note 7.
204. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 519-20 (2d Cir. 1985).
205. See supra Part 11(A).
206. See Buchheit, supra note 37, at 102-03; James Thuo Gathii, The Sanctity of Sovereign Loan
Contractsand Its Origins in Enforcement Litigation,38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 252, 255-58 (2006).

207. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 520.
208. Id. at 521-22.
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In Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina,20 9 the Second Circuit invoked
similar policy considerations to conclude that Argentina's unilateral extension
of the maturity of its U.S. dollar-denominated bonds, payable in New York,
caused a "direct effect" in the U.S. for purposes of the FSIA's commercial activity exception. 210 As these cases demonstrate, the Second Circuit endeavors to
enhance New York's reputation as a creditor-friendly jurisdiction, adopting
rulings that encourage debtors and creditors to conclude debt agreements
governed by New York law.
In its opinion in NML II, the Second Circuit once again invoked New
York's status as a leading commercial center, stating that this status "is advanced by requiring debtors, including foreign debtors, to pay their debts., 211 A
question to think about is whether the Second Circuit's affirmance of the
Injunction Order went too far. The order's controversial interpretation of the
pani passu covenant, 212 combined with its broad reach, so drastically enhances
the leverage of holdout creditors at the expense of sovereign debtors and holders of restructured debt that it may dissuade foreign sovereigns from issuing
debt under New York law in the future. Some observers predict that NML II
provides issuers of sovereign debt an incentive to leave the New York market
and instead issue debt under English or local law.213 In response to the NML
litigation, an association of international capital market participants recently
adopted changes to model clauses, including the pari passu covenant, in standard sovereign debt contracts.214 By highlighting the weaknesses of the existing,
voluntary approach to sovereign debt restructurings, the NML litigation has
even prompted a revival of interest in a failed 2001 International Monetary
Fund proposal to establish a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism.2 5
These reactions to the NML litigation attest to its political sensitivity and to

209. 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), aft'd, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
210. Id. at 153-54; see also L'Europeene de Banque v. La Republica de Venez., 700 F. Supp. 114,
122 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing the policies identified in Allied Bank in support of its conclusion that Venezuela's repudiation of a debt payable in New York caused a "direct effect" in the U.S. for purposes of
the FSIA). But see Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 618 (finding that New York's status as an international financial center is too attenuated an effect to qualify as "direct" for purposes of
the FSIA).
211. NML 11, 727 F.3d at 248.
212. See text accompanying supra note 129.
213. Supplemental Choi Declaration, supra note 178, at Appendix C, para. 33; Stiglitz, supra note
183.
214. See Anna Gelpern, A Sensible Step to Mitigate Sovereign Bond Dysfunction, REALTIME
ECONOMIC ISSUES WATCH (Aug. 29, 2014, 4:57 PM), http://blogs.piie.com/realtime/?p=4485 (discussing the International Capital Market Association's August 2014 adoption of Standard Collective Action
and Pari Passu Clauses for the Terms and Conditions of Sovereign Notes).
215. See R. Wigglesworth & A. Beattie, Bankruptcy Regime for Nations Urged,FIN. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2013), availableat http:/ /www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/ ad3068d6-4613-1 le2-ae8d-0044feabdc0.html.
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its legal and economic significance. The extraordinary level of interest the litigation has attracted, both from the New York financial community and internationally, highlights another reason why U.S. courts should read the FSIA as
limiting the permissible reach of such enforcement orders. As the Supreme
Court stated in Kiobel, quoting its previous decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain,216
the potential foreign policy implications of recognizing causes under the [Alien Tort
Statute] should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the
discretion of the
217
Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.

The Second Circuit's affinnance of extraterritorial enforcement measures
against Argentina in the NML litigation raises similar foreign policy concerns.
When Congress enacted the FSIA, it defined the exceptions to immunity
against execution more narrowly than it did the exceptions to immunity from
suit precisely because the issue of execution against a foreign state's assets was
particularly sensitive and controversial.218 It remains so today, and in this
context a more restrained approach to applying the FSIA is especially needed.

216. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
217. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727) (brackets and ellipses omitted).
218. See supra Part II(C).

